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Scottish and British agriculture has over the past fifty years undergone 
a transformation so profound that it is barely recognisable from the past. 
State support, technological innovation, new practices, new products have 
all transformed the agrarian economy and society of Scotland, and, in many 
places, the face of the land itself. This article attempts to identify and 
evaluate the most important economic and political developments bearing 
upon Scottish agriculture in the Seventies and Eighties. We start, however, 
with a brief history of agriculture support policies in Britain. 
The "Great Depression" to 1939 
British agriculture reached its zenith of prosperity in the 1860s. 
Around 1875 it entered a period of sustained depression- of falling product 
and land prices, lower rents and untenanted farms- which was to continue 
for almost forty years, ending only with the outbreak of world war. It was in 
this period that farming finally ceased to be Britain's major industry, 
unable to compete with imports of cheap grain and meat from Latin 
America, Australia, New Zealand and the American prairies. The effects 
of what became known as the "Great Depression" were most marked in the 
wheat growing areas of England. Scottish farming, being more dependent 
on stock activities and with only a small-scale involvement in wheat 
production, survived the shock of the depression better. If Symon is to be 
believed this was due also in no small measure to the moral sturdiness and 
resourcefulness of the Scottish farmer, who countered adversity by, 
" ... .industry, thrift, an excellent rotation system, attention to the 
breeding and management of livestock, sound labour organisation, 
skill and pride in farm craft, and the combination of agricultural 
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science, so far as was then known, with practice."(!) 
Not that Scottish agriculture was without its difficulties. The effects of 
the depression were probably most severe on the uneconomically small 
units of the eastern glens, as well as on that cold, infertile central plateau 
that stretches from Midlothian in the east to Dunbartonshire in the west. 
Above all, the depression severely affected the viability of hill sheep 
farming, particularly in the Highlands where the glens, having already been 
emptied of people, were now cleared of sheep. A concomitant of this 
sectoral decline was a rising demand for moors for sporting purposes by the 
magnates of the new, industrial Britain. This large-scale appropriation of 
land for the recreation and pleasure of the few is a symbolic and literal 
blight on the face of Scotland that has yet to be expunged. Elsewhere, 
farmers survived as best they could in face of the official indifference 
engendered by the prevailing ideology of economic laissez-faire and the 
imperative of cheap (imported) food for an expanding industrial 
workforce. 
Agricultural fortunes improved briefly during and immediately after 
the First World War as the exigencies of conflict forced a reluctant and 
faltering government to impose price controls and guarantee product 
prices. Scottish agriculture responded rapidly to this stimulus, with the 
acreage under grain growing by over 20% in two years. Soon after the 
Armistice Lloyd George was heard to declare that never again would the 
industry be left to sink or swim. In 1921, as world prices tumbled, its war-
time system of agricultural support was dismantled. Depression returned 
with renewed force. Prices did gradually recover until, in 1929, another and 
more severe slump recurred. Everywhere land reverted to grass; many 
farms bore an air of neglect and decay; rural poverty was endemic. By 
1939, "the damage done to the industry had been immense and, often, in the 
poorer areas irreparable. Where the permanent equipment of the marginal 
land farms had been allowed to fall into gross decay; so impoverished had 
much of this land become that it had degenerated into an agricultural slum, 
occupied in the main by old and infirm persons. These, by pursuing the least 
productive form of farming - the rearing of store sheep - managed 
somehow, and often with outside aid, to maintain themselves on a low 
standard of living. Impoverished farms with many derelict fields were to be 
seen everywhere in the poorer areas, silent but eloquent testimonies to the 
depression in agriculture". <2l 
Grasping this history of neglect, indifference and betrayal is vital to an 
understanding of the collective mentality of farmers. A sense of 
beleaguered adversity, of threat from an ignorant, uncaring urban mass, 
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"backs-against-the-wall" rhetoric, an unquenchable belief in the dignity 
and indispensability of their calling are characteristic elements of the self-
image and public pronouncements of farmers. If the effects are often 
risible, inducing only cynicism in the hearer, they nonetheless have a very 
real historical basis. 
World War Two to 1973 
The sustained support and management of agricultural markets dates 
largely from the Second World War, though some aspects date from the 
inter-war years - principally, the de-rating of agricultural land, the 
formation of the Milk Marketing Boards<3l, and the introduction of some 
limited support and subsidies for wheat, barley, oats and beef. 
The outbreak of war immediately accorded agriculture the status of a 
strategic industry. Overwhelmed by governmental advice and aid, farmers 
once again rapidly expanded output. In Britain, in the three years from 
1938-9 to 1941-2 the value of gross output rose by two-thirds. In Scotland 
the area under tillage was increased by 639,000 acres in four years, with 
wheat and barley production more than doubling. The farmers' 
contribution to British victory was substantial and indispensable, providing 
them with "a moral account on which they were able to draw heavily when 
the war had ended", <4l as well as giving the NFU a key weapon in its 
propaganda armoury. <5l 
This time around state support was consolidated and extended beyond 
the years of wartime emergency. A number of factors came into play. In the 
first place it was obvious that food shortages were going to last well beyond 
the end of the war itself, while it was hoped that sustained agricultural 
output would relieve the currrency and balance of payments crisis 
attendant upon the ending of Lend-Lease. The election of a reforming 
Labour government was not without consequence either. The widespread 
rural poverty of recent memory could lay claim to its egalitarian 
sympathies, while agriculture could also serve to exemplify the value and 
benefits of a managed economy. So begins the curious and ironic tale of 
Labour's involvement with Britain's farmers. <6l 
The first piece of post-war agricultural legislation was the Hill-Farming 
Act of 1946 which provided support for farm improvement in the hills. 
However the centrepiece of the post -war agricultural settlement was 
undoubtedly the Agriculture Act of 1947. The Act undertook to provide 
"proper remuneration" for farmers and farmworkers and an "adequate 
return" on invested capital by providing price guarantees for (and here 
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follows a sentence of majestic and fruitful ambiguity) "such part of the 
nation's food and other agricultural produce as in the national interest it is 
desirable to produce in the United Kingdom". 
At first, while wartime controls were still in operation, farmers were 
paid a fixed price for their produce by the government. From 1953 and until 
entry into the EEC a "deficiency payments" system of price control 
operated. Imported food was by and large free to enter the country, with 
farmers being repaid the difference between a guaranteed price and the 
market price actually obtaining when domestic produce was sold in 
competition with imports. In this way some of the institutions and forms of 
a free market were restored, albeit one whose parameters were largely 
defined by the state. 
The short-run results on output of the new legislation were 
disappointing. Between 1945-6 and 1950-1 output at constant prices rose by 
only about 8.5%, a long way short of the official goal of a 60% increase by 
1956. Understandably perhaps, farmers seem to have initially spent their 
increased incomes on personal consumption rather than on productive 
investment. The official response to this was the introduction of production 
grants in the Fifties with the aim of increasing "efficiency".(?) Grants were 
made available for, amongst other things, hill cows and sheep, fertilizer 
purchase, bringing pasture under the plough, hedgegrow removal and 
bracken eradication. By 1960-61 such payments accounted for nearly 40% 
of all public expenditure on agriculture. In conjunction with the high levels 
of relatively stable prices provided by guarantees, production grants soon 
made a dramatic impact on both the volume of output and the pattern of 
farming. The pace of mechanization increased sharply, fertilizer usage shot 
up, and crop yields improved markedly. In Scotland the total output ofthe 
main cereal crops (wheat, barley and oats) rose from 1,032,000tons in 1950 
to 1,200,000 tons in 1960 despite a fall of nearly 11% in the area devoted to 
these crops. The value of total agricultural output rose from £121,096 to 
£168,617 over the same period. But as world food prices fell during the 
1960s, the costs of agricultural policy grew. The agriculture departments 
and the Treasury were also having to face the emerging problem of 
surpluses, particularly of milk, as growth in output spiralled far in excess of 
consumption. Attempts were made to control output, and to limit the 
Exchequer's liability, by imposing "standard quantities" on milk. (S) This 
policy achieved some short-term success, but the long-run trend was still 
towards growing output. 
One of the most remarkable policy developments of the Fifties was 
contained in the Agriculture Act of 1957. The 1947 Act had required the 
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Agriculture Ministers<9l to conduct an annual review of the economic 
conditions and prospects of agriculture as the basis upon which economic 
guarantees would be settled for a specified list of commodities. (By 
requiring their active participation this review procedure greatly enhanced 
the power and influence of the NFUs). The 1957 Act required the 
government to keep the total value of its guarantees at not less than 97.5% 
of the previous year, a remarkable self-imposed constraint on its budgetary 
autonomy. 
This system of support continued largely unchanged in its essentials 
until entry to the EEC in 1973. However the value of price support was held 
down throughout the Sixties, despite the clamourings for expansion in the 
latter half of the decade which received expression in Labour's "National 
Plan" of 1965. (to) 
A new decade and a new government brought higher guaranteed 
prices, eventual entry into the EEC and a fundamental reorientation in our 
system of agricultural support. 
The Common Agricultural Policy 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is an institution of truly 
baroque complexity. Here only the briefest sketch of its operations will be 
attempted. 
CAP expenditure (which in 1981 accounted for more than 67% of the 
total Community budget) is administered through the European 
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (FEOGA, after its French 
title). FEOGA disburses its budget under two main headings: 
(1) Price guarantees - which account for more than 95% of total 
expenditure. 
Structural measures ("Guidance"), concerned with such matters as 
farm size, agricultural employment, investment etc. 
Prices and markets are manipulated by a combination of internal price 
supports and external protection. Each year the Council of Ministers sets 
desired prices (variously known as "target", "guide", "basic" and "norm" 
prices) for a set list of commodities. The market is then manipulated, 
principally by levies on imported goods, in an attempt to achieve the 
desired prices. At a certain percentage (generally a little over 90%) below 
this price there is an intervention price at which intervention agencies are 
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obliged to buy any produce offered to them. This surplus output may be 
variously, 
(1) Stored- hence the EEC's surreal landscape of food mountains and 
lakes 
(2) Destroyed 
(3) Exported - with the aid of "export restitutions" to bring the price 
down to the world market price 
Price guarantees are open-ended; that is, there have until recently 
been no restrictions on the quantities which may be sold into intervention. 
Further complexities (and expense) are engendered by Monetary 
Compensatory Allowances (MCAs), a system of internal subsidies and 
levies intended to iron out trade "distortions" caused by the absence of a 
common currency, floating exchange rates and divergent economic 
conditions among the member states. 
Structural policy has never assumed its intended importance and now 
accounts for less than 5% of total FEOGA expenditure. Structural 
measures operative within the CAP include aids for farm amalgamation 
and capital investment on small farms. As far as Scottish agriculture is 
concerned the most important structural policy is the Less Favoured Areas 
Directive of 1975 which provides investment aid for farm modernisation in 
the hills and uplands as well as an annual livestock subsidy known as the Hill 
Livestock Compensatory Allowance (HLCA). In the area of structural 
policy member states retain a great deal of autonomy with regard both to 
the goals and level of support. There also still remain some purely national 
elements of price support; Britain's sheep variable premium being one such 
example. 
The marked disproportion between the Guarantee and Guidance 
sections of FEOGA is of crucial importance in understanding the present 
crisis and future direction of the Common Agricultural Policy. It is an issue 
to which we shall return. 
Entry to the EEC provided a spectacular bonanza for British farmers. 
Compared with the old British system guaranteed prices were higher under 
the new Community regime, and in the years following entry farm incomes 
rose dramatically as the following table shows.<11 l 
In both Scotland and England farm income rose steadily throughout 
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the first half of the Seventies and, particularly in Scotland, managed to keep 
ahead of movements in the Retail Price Index. Incomes peaked in 1976177 
in Scotland and 1978/79 in England. Since then, apart from a brief 
improvement in 1981182 (and 1980/81 in the case of England) they have 
steadily fallen, the decline being particularly marked in Scotland. The latest 
Annual Review<12) showed a drop in incomes in 1982/83 of 15% in the UK 
and 29% in Scotland. The divergent income trends in England and Scotland 
are in large part a result of differences in the main types of farming. 
Livestock and dairy farming are far more important in Scotland than in 
England<13l, and it is these farm-types (and, in the main, the lower-income 
farmers) which have been disproportionately affected over the past few 
years. 
As can be seen, the only farm-types to have maintained their real 
incomes are cereal and crop farms. Such variations in farm-type 
performance imply regional variations in agricultural profitability. In 
Scotland, as in England, there is a long-term trend towards increasing 
enterprise specialization and the geographical concentration of farm-
types. <t4) Thus arable production is particularly prevalent in the eastern 
Borders, East Lothian, Fife, Angus, the Mearns and the Laigh of Moray. In 
addition, there is in the North-east a particularly heavy concentration of 
arable with rearing farms - farms combining arable production with 
intensive livestock production (especially of pigs) - whose incomes are 
likely to have held up reasonable well. Dairy production, in contrast, is 
heavily concentrated in South-west Scotland where over one-third of all 
Scottish dairy farms are to be found. 
Over fifty years of sustained support has helped transform Scottish and 
British agriculture. Production grants and the maintenance of price 
stability have encouraged capital investment, the increasing use of 
manufactured inputs (fertilizer, pesticides, machinery etc.) and turned the 
drift from the land into a floodtide. In 1951 Scottish agriculture employed 
87,710 full-time workers; by 1981 the corresponding figure was 32,903, a 
fall of over 60%. There have been huge changes in production practices 
arising not just from technological innovation, but also from the application 
of an ever-growing body of scientific knowledge and expertise to the 
rationalization of crop production and animal husbandry. Land prices and 
yields have risen almost constantly since the fifties, at the same time as 
there has been an extension in the area of owner-occupied land. In 1945 
around 31% of Scottish agricultural land was owner-occupied. By 1982 that 
figure had risen to 58%. The cereals acreage (a traditional indicator of 
agricultural prosperity) has expanded, from 1.18 million acres to 1.3 million 
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acres an increase of 10%. However improved yields have meant that total 
production has increased by well over 70%. New products have been 
introduced, perhaps the most famous, or notorious, being oilseed rape, 
whose bright yellow intrusions on the landscape have come to symbolize 
the wasteful extravagancies of the CAP. Almost unknown in Britain prior 
to EEC membership, its growth has been encouraged by hefty subsidies 
with the aim of providing a Community substitute for cheaper imported oils 
and animal feeds. Total UK production rose from 33 million tons per 
annum in 1972-74 to 580 million tonnes in 1982. In Scotland the area 
planted was so small, or even non-existent, that no returns were made in the 
Agricultural Census period to June 1982, when nearly 4,000 acres were 
reported to be under this crop. 
This then is the backdrop against which current developments are 
being played out. It should be clear that the crucial decisions affecting the 
health and future of Scottish agriculture are made not in Edinburgh but, 
rather, in London and Brussels. It may also be noted that the superior 
staffing and budgetary resources of the English and Welsh NFU, together 
with that organisation's proximity to the metropolitan centres.of power, 
gives it rather more power and influence in government circles than is 
possessed by the Scottish NFU. G(Js) As tensions and dissensions within the 
farmers' unions mount in response to actual and proposed cuts in support, 
this fact may assume an increasing practical significance. But it is time now 
to tum to a consideration of recent economic, social and political 
developments which have, or have been generally identified as having, 
especial significance for the future of Scottish and British agriculture. 
Scottish Agriculture and the Land Issue 
Agricultural production is ultimately inseparable from the land issue, 
from control over the use and abuse of one of our most basic productive 
resources. But our ignorance on this issue is boundless. Of course, since 
land confers wealth, prestige and not a little power upon its owners it is 
perhaps not surprising that so little is known about its use and ownership. 
Such silences insinuate the powerful presence of a class which has come to 
recognize the "advantages of discretion and ambiguity". (!6) In the absence 
of an official register of landownership we are left with McEwen's splendid 
but still incomplete and increasingly outdated study of Who Owns 
Scotlancf 17l, which shows the extent of private landownership in 1970. 
What is most remarkable is the extent to which the Scottish landed estate 
has maintained its position over a century of unprecedented economic. 
social and political change. Although ownership is certainly not as 
concentrated as it was in the last century its persistence in just a few hands 
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remains startling. McEwen shows that 63% of the Scottish land area was in 
1734 private estates of 1,000 acres or more. Fifty-three landowners with 
estates of more than 40,000 acres held 18% of Scotland's land, while the top 
549 owned nearly half ( 49%) of the country. 
The decisions of landowners can, and do, have a powerful impact on 
the economies of rural areas and the life chances of their residents. Thus 
attempts in the 1960s to revitalize the agricultural economy of Mull 
foundered in face of opposition from local landlords who preferred to turn 
what was by Highland standards good agricultural land over to sporting 
uses, in the process evicting farming tenants. OS) In a contrasting case study 
of the Luss Estates in Dunbartonshire, Bird09 l has documented the effects 
on the local community of an aggressively commercial approach to the 
land. The Laird's primary concerns were with achieving high returns from 
his property and ensuring its succession. To this end life-long tenancies for 
estate-workers were abolished, who then often faced eviction on the 
termination of employment; land was taken in hand as tenancies expired; 
estate houses were left empty for most of the year to be let to summer 
holidaymakers, while attempts to purchase land for council housing were 
repeatedly resisted. The result is the decline of the local community as its 
old occupational base is eroded and new and potentially revitalising 
developments are blocked. 
The twentieth century as a whole, and particularly the post- war years, 
have seen a decline in the extent ofthe traditional landed estates, and thus 
the erosion of the previous three-tier hierarchy of landowner, tenant-
farmer and agricultural labourer. Initially the reasons for this change lay in 
the operation of Engel's Law, which states that as overall incomes increase 
there is a long-run tendency for returns to agriculture to decline. Latterly, 
as agricultural support policies have mitigated the impact of this law, fiscal 
policies which discriminate against owners of let land and the income 
advantages which attach to direct farming have become more important. 
Some of this increase in owner-occupation is undoubtedly accounted for by 
the purchase of estate land by sitting tenants. But some of it (and naturally 
we don't know how much) results from the taking in hand of land by 
traditional owners. In the absence of a cadastral record of landholding, or 
detailed local studies, we cannot reliably say to what extent land has 
changed hands over the past century (and thus, too, how far the Scottish 
agrarian class structure has changed). On the basis of McEwen's figures and 
the continued concentration of landholding they reveal, the answer is 
perhaps "not all that much". 
These changes have implied, too, an effective convergence of interest 
116 
Scottish Government Yearbook 1985 
between landowners and farmers, with the result that on many issues the 
Scottish NFU and the Scottish Landowners' Federation are able to speak as 
one voice. There is no doubt that both organizations can exert quite 
considerable influence on the Scottish Office, but, once again, the 
mechanisms and channels through which such influence is exercised are 
largely invisible and unexplored. Here, as elsewhere in Scottish society, 
power is real but effectively anonymous. The linkages between 
landowners, farmers, the Scottish ruling class and the exercise of local and 
national political power is a fascinating, much needed and still unwritten 
study.<ZO) 
By 1970 it seemed as if a new and fairly stable system of agricultural 
property relationships had emerged. But two developments during that 
decade were to threaten the future of private landownership: namely the 
emergence of financial institutions as major agents in the land market and 
capital taxation. 
The Financial Institutions 
The repetition is becoming increasingly tedious but- once again- our 
knowledge of this topic is patchy. However according to one of the more 
reliable recent estimates<21l, financial institutions owned 82,400 acres of let 
agricultural land in Scotland (or 1. 95% of the acreage of crops and grass). 
While substantial institutional involvement in farmland purchases in the 
arable counties of eastern England dates from the early Seventies, 
involvement in the Scottish farmland market is more recent. The Savills-
RTP survey indicates that 82% (or 67,900 acres) of all institutional 
purchases of Scottish farmland have taken place since 1976. (n) That date is 
perhaps not entirely fortuitous. The Northfield Committee<23l reported that 
at one time there had been a reluctance to invest in Scotland because of the 
greater security of tenure afforded to tenants there, until such differences 
were largely removed by the Agriculture (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 
1976. Matters have now changed so much that in 1982 34% oftotal British 
purchases were in Scotland, where stable capital values and increasing 
yields relative to the rest of Britain provided a considerable stimulus to 
investment. 
Corroboration of the scale of recent institutional activity in the 
Scottish agricultural land market is provided by figures released by 
DAFS. (Z4) These indicate that in 1979-81 such institutions bought a total of 
some 44,000 acres of farmland. What is particularly interesting is the 
relative scale of their involvement in the Scottish land market. In 1979, 1980 
and 1981 the institutions accounted for 8%, 12.5% and 10.6% respectively 
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of all sales of land remaining in agriculture. These proportions are 
substantially higher than the 3.6% per annum given in the Northfield 
Report. (25) In the case of land sold out of agriculture for afforestation in 
these same years the institutions accounted for 45%, 36.2% and 67.5% 
respectively of all purchases. (26) Such information as exists suggests that the 
bulk of such purchases are concentrated in the eastern lowlands from 
Berwickshire to Nairn, not surprisingly, perhaps, in view of the institutions' 
well-known preference for large arable or mixed farms on prime land. 
Transfers of land on the scale reported above, if sustained for any 
length of time, could lead to financial institutions coming to play an 
increasingly significant role in Scottish agriculture. Their importance, 
perhaps even their predominance, would be less likely to arise from 
owership of land per se, than from control over a disporportionate share of 
total production. In Scotland, as elsewhere in Britain, a small proportion of 
enterprises account for the bulk of total production. To give a few 
examples: in 1982 18% of all cereal growing farms produced 63% of total 
production, 46% of the total number of beef cattle were to be found in just 
13% of herds, and 23% of dairy herds accounted for a little over half of the 
total number of dairy cattle. 
If we take note, too, of the institutions' bias in favour of large, well-
equipped farms on superior land, we might be well advised to give credence 
to the Centre for Agricultural Strategy's observation that while fewer than 
865,000 acres changes hands in the UK every year, 
" .... it is inconceivable that a substantial proportion of UK farmland 
could pass into the hands of City institutions in the next decade. On 
the other hand, it is possible that, if financial institutions made a 
concerted effort and bought up the (150,000 acres) oflarge farms ..... 
coming on to the market each year, they could be responsible for just 
under 50% of UK agricultural production within 30 years"i27l 
While institutional purchases in the UK have not been on this scale, 
the potential for control nonetheless remains very great indeed. 
If our understanding of the activities and purchases of financial 
institutions as a whole is inadequate, then how much more so is our 
knowledge of who exactly owns what and where. McEwen's otherwise 
invaluable work is not particularly helpful in this instance, since it 
essentially presents a snapshot of Scottish landholding in 1970, before the 
current wave of institutional investment. The names, but often not much 
more, of some institutions are known: for example, the Commercial Union 
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Assurance Co. Ltd., the Prudential Assurance Company and the Post 
Office Superannuation Scheme. In any event it is quite probable that only a 
small number of individual institutions are involved in the Scottish 
agricultural land market. The Northfield Committee reported that while 
the number of institutions investing in farmland had risen considerably 
during the 1970s, these funds still remained in a small minority. No 
consensus existed among institutions over the purchase of agricultural land, 
though it was generally agreed that the necessarily long-term nature of 
investment in agriculture did not make it attractive either to mature funds 
or to those that needed to maintain a high level of liquidity. (28l But whatever 
the precise details of ownership may be, it is undoubtedly the case that the 
activities of the institutions "represent, potentially at least, one of the most 
significant developments in landownership in this country in the last fifty 
years". i29l Collectively they represent the fastest growing landowner in 
Britain, and as perhaps the most important agents in the contemporary 
British economy developments in their activities and investment decisions 
deserve to be carefully scrutinized. It has been argued that the emergence 
of the institutions as significant landowners signals the end of that long-run 
trend toward owner-occupied farming that followed upon the break-up of 
the large-landed estates in the aftermath of the First World War. We might 
thus be witnessing a new separation of the functions of landowner and 
farmer. Alternatively, the institutions might take land in hand and either 
farm directly or in partnership with specialised farming companies. If this 
were to happen on any scale, the corporate dominance of production 
characteristic of some sectors and regions of United States agriculture 
would become a feature of British farming. 
Capital Taxation 
The rise of the institutions was only one of a number of developments 
in the Seventies which threatened established property relations in 
agriculture. Land values, which had risen steadily throughout the Fifties 
and Sixties, spiralled dramatically in the Seventies, particularly in the years 
from 1972 to 1974 when land values doubled or even trebled. Almost 
overnight the asset-value of owner-occupied enterprises burgeoned, with 
the larger farmers on prime land becoming paper-millionaires. However, 
far from welcoming their good fortune, many farmers looked upon their 
new-found wealth with gloomy trepidation as the incoming Labour 
government of 1974 brought with it "penal" capital taxation in the shape of 
Capital Transfer Tax. This in conjunction with Capital Gains Tax (and-
who could say?- the possibility of an annual wealth tax), seemed to place 
the inter-generational continuity of farming and land-holding in jeopardy, 
since on his death a farmer's survivors would be forced to sell land in order 
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to meet crippling tax demands. Apart from the state, the most likely 
purchasers of such land would be the financial institutions who, unlike mere 
farmers, are immortal. 
All these developments drew vehement, acrimonious and often bitter 
comment from the farming community and their spokesmen, never more so 
perhaps than when it was the activities of the institutions that were being 
called into question. There was plenty of scope for the habitual suspicion 
and defensive paranoia of farmers, with many coming to believe in 
'"a vague conspiracy by the City and the government: the City 
institutions, by forcing up land prices, were imposing a crippling CIT 
burden on the individual landowner who was thereby forced to sell 
out to them "<30l 
In point of fact it is far more likely that the movement of the 
institutions into land and their willingness to bid high prices was part of a 
wider confidence in land, which was itself a response to, inter alia, growing 
inflation rates, declining industrial profitability, looming economic crisis, a 
bumper harvest in 1973 under conditions of world shortage, not to mention 
the hopes inspired by entry into the EEC. If a villain must be found then it is 
probably "roll-over-relief' rather than the city institutions which should be 
arraigned. <31) 
In the event matters have not turned out as badly as was first hoped or 
feared. In the first place, and partly as a consequence of the concessions 
progressively extended to owner-occupier and tenant farmers, capital 
taxation does not present an insurmountable problem to most farmers. 
Using data derived from MAFF's Farm Management Survey, 
Peters(3Z) has estimated both the wealth and CIT liability of various groups 
of farmers. He reports that on the basis of net worth all full-time owner-
occupier farmers fall among the top 6% of wealth owners. Small dairy 
farmers just make that level while large cropping and livestock farmers are 
easily in the top half per cent. On the income side farmers are on the whole 
in a less favoured position than with respect to wealth. All large farms and 
medium cropping farms would fall into the upper 1% of the distribution, 
medium size dairy and livestock farms into the upper 10% or incomes with 
small dairy and livestock farmers slipping down to about the fourth decile. 
However, 
"Despite this it can fairly be stated that owner-occupiers belong to a 
particularly wealthy sector of the community who are also 
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advantageously placed, though less markedly, in terms of 
income" .l33l 
In spite of this marked concentration of wealth, farmers are not 
particularly vulnerable to capital taxation. Peters suggests that the full CIT 
liability of small and medium dairy and livestock farms could for the most 
part be met out of income. But all other farms would be threatened if their 
maximum theoretical CIT and CGT liability had to be met. However, if a 
farmer is prudent enough to take sound financial advice and make 
maximum use of the concessions and loopholes available under the acts 
then he can, in most cases, ensure the transfer of his business. Tenant 
farmers have even fewer problems in spite of the fact that larger tenants 
have wealth sufficient to place them within the top second or third 
percentile in the national placings. However, it is likely that CIT will 
further encourage the decline of the traditional agricultural landlord since, 
as has been the case throughout the century, the owners of let land are 
treated far more harshly than owner-farmers. Consequently, more land is 
likely to be taken in hand or sold to sitting tenants or other buyers such as 
the financial institutions. 
Agricultural Incomes 
It seems clear, therefore, that farmers are a relatively wealthy and 
privileged group within British and Scottish society. Nor should the falling 
farm incomes of recent years necessarily lead us to modify that judgement. 
The agriculture departments' annual calculations of Net Farm Income 
(NFI) are important primarily as a resource for production-oriented 
economic studies of the industry or, and just as importantly, as a weapon in 
the negotiations, debates and battles between the NFUs and Government. 
While the are undeniable links between the incomes of individuals (or 
families) and the aggregate: 
"the situation is too complex for a simplistic view to be acceptable, 
and changes in the industry figure do not necessarily offer a valuable 
guide to what is happening to the incomes of farmers and their 
families". (J4) 
In particular industry figures are unsatisfactory in two main respects: 
(1) Farm households may have income from sources other than farming. 
Hill, for example, has shown that only 63% of the total income of 
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While, with appropriate modifications, Net Farm Income might make 
a useful indicator of incomes on tenanted farms, its ignoral of capital 
gains makes it of limited value in the case of owner-occupied farms. 
Farming spokesmen often like to pretend that capital gains are 
somehow unreal - existing only on paper - and are of little real 
consequence or benefit to the farmer. Of course, there are problems in 
realizing capital gains if wealth is held in land, but part of any gain in 
real net worth can be realized indirectly, for example through extra 
borrowing. At any rate: 
'"When a capital gain is realised there is a clear release of purchasing 
power to the person or family owning the asset. When capital gains are 
NOT realised by disposal ..... it is evident that unrealised gains still 
constitute part of real personal income. U nrealised gains represent the 
value of rights which the owner MIGHT HAVE exercised in 
consumption without diminishing the value of his wealth". (36) 
Hill goes on to argue that if capital gains are taken into account then 
almost 50% can be added to UK Net Farm Income in 1976n7 (a year in 
which NFI was particularly high), raising the proportion ofthe sample with 
incomes of £10,000 and over from 45% to 65%. (J?) 
While the average figures for Scotland will be lower than the UK 
figures quoted here, there can be little doubt that as a group Scottish 
farmers are rather better off than the majority of their compatriots. In 
particular, the large east coast arable farmers must be among the wealthiest 
in Britain. 
For many farmers, this prosperity is of comparatively recent origin. 
Bowers and Cheshire<38l have derived an income series for UK farmers and 
other occupational groups over the period 1935-77. At constant 1976 prices 
the "average" farmer's annual income rose fairly steady from £1,177 in 1938 
(80% of average male manual wages and 152% of average agricultural 
worker wages) to £7,384 (209% and 281% respectively) in 1973-77. The 
change in farmers' economic status is dramatically obvious, fully bearing 
out the authors' assertion that farmers as a group "have moved from a 
position of absolute and relative poverty to a position of substantial 
prosperity" _<39l It is equally obvious that this transformation has been 
effected primarily by the ever-burgeoning financial and administrative 
apparatus of state-support for agriculture. Not that its benefits have been 
evenly or equitably distributed. Far from it. Support policy as we shall see 
raises the incomes of farmers proportionately to their richness. And farm 
workers remain amongst the lowest paid and disadvantaged of all 
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occupational groups, poverty and dependence being their all too-common 
lot. In 1983 average weekly wages for full-time male agricultural workers 
stood at £112.25 per week (including overtime payments and the value of 
perquisites), or 77% of the average Scottish male manual wage. 
This digression upon farmers' income and wealth is not a purely 
academic exercise. Knowledge about such matters will naturally be 
relevant to an assessment of the position of farmers in the contemporary 
Scottish class structure. But it has, too, a direct importance for agricultural 
policy-making; or so one might naively presume. 
Concern over the incomes of farmers has been a fundamental but ill-
defined and poorly articulated component of the post-war agricultural 
policies of both the United Kingdom and the EEC. It has often been 
assumed that a gap exists between farm and non-farm incomes which 
should be closed (though commentators have typically been vague as to the 
magnitude of this gap). Such concerns lie behind the declared objectives of 
ensuring the "proper remuneration and living conditions for farmers and 
workers" ofthe 1947 Agriculture Act and the "fair standard ofliving for the 
agricultural community" of the Treaty of Rome. But there has been little 
attempt to translate such goals into detailed and coherent policy 
formulations. Any comprehensive and workable programme to eradicate 
agricultural poverty surely requires details of the sectoral and regional 
distribution of real incomes within agriculture, detailed knowledge of the 
structure of the agricultural industry (including patterns of tenure and 
landownership )and a knowledge of the linkages between agriculture and 
other sectors of the economy. In all these areas our knowledge is to a 
greater or lesser extent deficient. In the case of incomes, Hill points out that 
"Despite the importance of being able to assess the poverty and 
comparability aspects of agricultural policy ...... incomes have never 
been officially measured in ways which can be used to indicate in any 
meaningful manner the living standards of farmers". (40) 
The ambiguities and lacunae of this policy area have proven 
advantageous to the farming unions, allowing them both to blur and elide 
very real differences in the circumstances of different groups of farmers and 
to present any kind of increase in total agricultural support as a step towards 
eradicating agricultural poverty. And, of course, concern over agricultural 
incomes has invariably focussed on farmers' incomes at the expense of 
farmworkers. There undoubtedly are relatively poor farms and farmers in 
Scotland, more so than in England. For example, many small and medium 
size general dairy farms have probably experienced severe financial 
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problems in recent years, even before the imposition of quotas. But by far 
the largest number of marginal enterprises are to be found in the hills and 
uplands, where many farms are entirely dependent upon EEC and UK 
subventions for their survival. Indeed their precarious status and the vital 
contribution they make to the fragile local economy of many parts of 
Scotland has found official recognition in the classification of the so-called 
"Less Favoured Areas" which make up nearly three-quarters of the land 
area of Scotland. However, it nonetheless remains the case that the overall 
distribution of support is sharply skewed in favour of these high output/high 
income producers who are presumably least in need of it. In essence, 
support is biased towards large farms at the expense of the small and arable 
farmers rather than livestock farmers. Even in the hills and uplands large 
farmers benefit more from Hill Livestock Compensatory Allowances 
(which are paid on a headage basis) than their smaller counterparts. 
As budgetary crisis deepens, and financial constraints tighten, then 
more detailed knowledge of, and more carefully specified policies with 
respect to, farm incomes will become essential if the income maintenance 
goals of the Treaty of Rome are to be realized and the hill and upland 
economy of Scotland sustained. Otherwise, farm support will remain, in 
the words of the European Commission, "a source of social inequality 
under the cloak of economic equality". (4Il It is to the budgetary crisis of the 
Common Agricultural Policy and its potential effects upon Scottish 
agriculture that we now tum. 
Crisis in the CAP 
Attempts to limit agricultural output and support costs have been 
forced upon the EEC in response to growing food surpluses and the ever-
rising costs of price guarantees. In Scotland, the value of production grants 
and price supports administered by DAFS went from £38.25m in 1975/6 to 
£78.9m in 1983. In 1981/82 the relevant figure was £72.23m or £3,036 for 
each of the 23,790 farmers listed in the 1981 population census. (42l Nor does 
this take into account the value of CAP price support. Over the past five 
years the annual budget of the Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce 
(IBAP), the body charged with the implementation of CAP price support 
in the United Kingdom, has risen at a frightening rate: 
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TABLE3 












% Change 1979-1983 = 236% 
Source: IBAP Annual Reports. 
Bowers and Cheshire<43 l have argued that in 1979 support was worth 
about £10,000 to every farmer in the UK (or £5,000 perfarmer and worker) 
an estimate they consider to be fairly conservative. This represents a 
subsidy of between £60 and £80 for every agricultural acre in the UK (or 60-
95% of the level of average rents). It is clear that the costs of the Common 
Agricultural Policy have, particularly in a period of low growth and high 
unemployment, simply become insupportable. To these budgetary 
pressures must be added those arising from the political tensions 
engendered by the inequitable distribution of the CAP's costs among the 
member states. (
44
) Within Britain one has also to take account of the 
influence of a renascent New Right and its detestation of state intervention 
and subsidy in all things economic. Certainly it is an open secret that certain 
members of the present Cabinet, including the Prime Minister, have little 
sympathy for the farmers. 
So in April1984, confronted by impending bankruptcy, the EEC took 
the hitherto unprecedented step of imposing curbs on production in the 
shape of milk quotas, with stiff levies being imposed on excess production. 
Support prices for a range of other commodities were also cut slightly. The 
farmers' response was vehement. bitter and often self-righteous. 
Demonstrations were organised, demands were made for the Agriculture 
Minister's resignation (and occasionally his head), while from within the 
NFUs we could hear mutterings of discontent over the leadership's 
supposed failure to protect the dairymen's interests. This well-orchestrated 
chorus of indignation made no difference to the quotas, but it did succeed in 
getting the Government to introduce 'redundancy' payments for farmers 
wishing to leave the industry. For a farmer with a herd of 30 cows this will be 
worth about £20,000; a 180 cow dairyman will receive £120,000.<45 > 
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Despite these production restrictions, the EEC will still be faced with 
an estimated surplus of 12.5m tonnes of milk in the 1984/85 financial year, 
not to mention a budget which continues to lurch ever deeper into crisis. 
Further cuts in the value of price guarantees are therefore almost 
inevitable, with cereals and beef being high on the list of likely candidates 
for control at the 1985 price review. It is impossible to say just how harshly 
cuts will bite, or how they will be distributed across different sectors. Much 
will depend on general economic conditions within the Community, on the 
State of political relationships between member states and the sort of trade-
offs they facilitate, and, of course, the balance of power within the farmers' 
unions both at the national level and within COPA, the Community's 
federation of farmers' unions. Here we may note that cereal farmers 
traditionally constitute a powerful and well organised bloc: they are 
certainly well represented within the NFUs. 
Obviously, quotas and support price cuts, by raising the threshold of 
viability, will force many farmers out of business and act as a further 
stimulus to farm amalgamation and growing enterprise size. They are also 
likely to have an effect on the activities of financial institutions in the land 
market. Institutional purchases of farmland have been a response to high 
and stable levels of land prices. High land values have in turn been 
conditional upon state support for agriculture: support which has to a large 
extent been capitalized in land. In an econometric simulation Trail found 
that a 1% increase in farm support prices resulted, amongst other things, in 
an increase in farm income and land prices of around 10%. <46l 
Given that the investment decisions of institutions have in the past 
shown themselves to be highly sensitive to short-run fluctuations in the 
agricultural land market, one might therefore expect a decline in price 
support and land values to be followed by the institutions disengaging 
themselves from the farmland market. 
The hills and uplands 
An issue of particular concern to Scotland will be the future of 
subsidies for the nation's hill and upland farmers, whose dependence on 
outside support has already been noted. Any redirection in the level of 
subsidy could deprive the local economies of these regions of one of their 
most crucial supports. Moreover, the major land-use problems of such 
regions are not those of over-production and environmental damage, but 
all too often, and particularly in the Highlands, the misuse, neglect and 
underdevelopment of potentially productive land by private landlords.<47l 
At least in the short-run, therefore, there are good grounds for maintaining 
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agricultural support to these regions. However, in the long-run, if the social 
and economic viability of "marginal" regions is to be maintained (and, 
indeed, if large tracts oflowland Scotland and Britain are not to become the 
preserve of a privileged population of middle-class commuters who have 
taken over villages once populated by now displaced agricultural workers) 
greater consideration will have to be given to the respective goals and 
methods of agricultural policy and regional planning. In a study of the 
Orkneys, Slee<48l has pointed out the contradictory consequences of the 
lack of co-ordination between agricultural planning and regional and local 
planning. Thus one of the principal goals of the H.I.D.B. and the Orkney 
Islands Council has been the halting of depopulation. Agricultural policy-
makers, on the other hand, have directed their energies towards tackling 
the perceived problems of agricultural "backwardness" and "low incomes" 
by, inter alia, providing generous advice, grants and subsidies for capital 
improvements. But by encouraging the substitution of capital for labour 
these policies only exacerbate the very problems of unemployment and 
depopulation which regional and local policies are attempting to combat. 
Thus, in the absence of alternative sources of employment, agricultural 
policy tends to bring about what Gerald Wibberley has termed the paradox 
of "strong agricultures but weak rural communities", <49) as agricultural 
modernization helps create local unemployment, depopulation, surplus 
rural settlements, rising costs of maintaining infrastructures etc. If the 
present crisis of the CAP is to be resolved without either a wholesale 
withdrawal of funds for agricultural support, or sacrificing the interests of 
the most vulnerable producers in favour of those of the most powerful, 
much greater consideration will inevitably have to be given to structural 
reform and policy. The directions in which this may lead are best indicated 
by the EEC's Mansholt Plan of 1968. (SO) The Plan argued that because of the 
tendency of farm incomes to decline relative to the remainder of the 
economy (the aforementioned Engel's Law) farm income would be a 
perennial and ever more burdensome problem without an increase in the 
size of farms and a reduction in their number. It presented comprehensive 
proposals for reforming the structure of production. These included: 
( 1) the creation of more economic farms by the expansion and 
amalgamation of existing farms. 
(2) the withdrawal of some land (about some 13m acres amongst the then 
Six) from cultivation, mostly for afforestation. 
(3) regional development schemes to create new jobs in agricultural areas 
and so avoid depopulation. 
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( 4) reductions in price guarantees, principally in the dairy sector which 
even then was experiencing acute surplus problems. 
In face of vigorous oppositiOn from the Community's farmers' 
organisations the Plan was shelved. The need for such a programme of 
comprehensive development and reform has never been greater and given 
that member states retain a great deal of autonomy in the area of structural 
policy, a start could be made by the UK government in devising and 
implementing such a programme. Indeed, if the presently conflicting goals 
of farm income support, the containment of exchequer commitment to 
agriculture and the maintenance of economically and socially viable rural 
communities are to be reconciled, then such programmes of integrated 
policy-making and regional economic diversification are essential. This 
does not mean, however, that we have to accept prevailing definitions of 
what "modernisation" and "development" entail. In the case of agricultural 
policy for example, a welcome change would be a shift of emphasis away 
from capital subsidies toward labour subsidies. Not only would this delay 
the rate of outflow of labour from agriculture, but, especially in the 
Lowlands, it would also help minimize the environmental damage which 
accompanies modern capital-intensive farming. 
However, any attempt to implement successfully such a thorough-
going programme of rural development must face up to two crucial 
problems. In the first place the power wielded by landowners must be 
attacked and their capacity to resist personally unwelcome change eroded. 
Secondly, if economic diversification is not to proceed via the 
establishment of externally controlled branch plants by footloose 
metropolitan or multinational companies then some attempt must be made 
to establish local control over such developments. 
In the present political climate of governmental hostility to state 
intervention in the economy and indifference to the world beyond the 
golden vale of the south-east, such proposals inevitably have a utopian ring. 
However, here as in so many other respects so scandalous is Scotland's 
decline that nothing less than radical solutions and policies will do. In the 
meantime, the other political parties could usefully devote some thought to 
the problems facing rural Scotland. 
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